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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN MALAYSIA:
A SHIFT FROM GROUNDS BASED ON COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES





The year 2007 not only marks the celebration of fifty years since we achieved
independence, it also sees the completion of fifty years since our Federal Constitution ,
the foundation of our nation's strength, was enacted. The past decade has witnessed
tremendous developments, .both progressive and retrogressive, in the field of
Administrative Law. Prior to the year 1996, the Malaysian courts referred to the
rigid and technical common law rules governing judicial review of administrative
actions. In 1996, with the trail blazing judgment of the Court of Appeal in tan Tek
Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor, I the judicial trend shifted
from referring to common Jaw principles concerning the grounds of judicial review
to the Federal Constitution. Recent case law in Malaysia shows that the courts are
bold, creative and dynamic enough in the matter of judicial review by construing
the fundamental rights provisions in the Federal Constitution' broadly and liberally.
In particular, a fresh breath of life has been infused into Articles 5 and 8 of the
Constitution and both articles have now become important weapons in the artillery
of the judiciary to control the abuse of administrative power. The purpose of this
paper is to highlight some of these developments based on four grounds of judicial
review, i.e. procedural fairness, substantive fairness, proportionality and the right of
access to justice.
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
The first attempt to revive Articles 5 and 8 of the Federal Constitution in preference
over the common law principles can be perceived in the arena of Natural Justice.
Natural Justice is one of the grounds of judicial review invoked by the Malaysian
courts to strike down an unlawful administrative action. As Natural Justice is a creation
of common law', traditionally the Malaysian courts have been greatly influenced by
the developments in the English common law in their application of the principles of
Natural Justice. In the mid-1990s the Malaysian courts began to formulate a new and
different version of Natural Justice in the guise of Procedural Fairness.
[1996] 1 MLJ 261.
2 Refer to Articles 5- 13 of the Federal Constitution.
J Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 CBNS 180.
275
Persidangan Undang-undang Tuanku Ja'afar 2007
Procedural Fairness was first introduced by His Lordship Gopal Sri Ram JCA in
Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah bin Raja Shahruzzaman v Setiausaha Suruhanjaya
Pasukan Polis & Ors,' where his Lordship put forward the argument that the term
'procedural fairness' was to be preferred to the 'traditional nomenclature "rules of
Natural Justice".' The most sensational case came along the following year in Tan.
Tek Seng", where Gopal Sri Ram took his argument on Procedural Fairness further
to clothe it with a constitutional dimension. The doctrine of Procedural Fairness,
which ensured that a fair procedure is adopted by administrative bodies in each case
based on its own facts, was held to be a product of the combined effect of Articles
5(1) and 8(1) of the Federal Constitution.
The basis on which the court arrived at this conclusion is as follows: First,
the expression 'law' in Articles 5(1) and 8(1) was held to encompass not merely
substantive law but also procedure established by law. Secondly, the term 'equality'
in Article 8(1) was interpreted to include 'fairness'. Thus, the combined effect of
Articles 5(1) and 8(1) brought about the doctrine of procedural fairness. Further, the
Court of Appeal gave a broad and liberal interpretation to the word 'life' in Article
5(1). It was construed to incorporate livelihood or employment. Therefore, the
combined effect of Articles 5(1) and 8(1) imposes and ensures Procedural Fairness
whenever a person's livelihood is adversely affected by a decision-maker.7
The above decision is significant in Administrative Law as it has infused new
life into the Federal Constitution. The Court of Appeal decisively pronounced that
the Constitution is a living, organic and dynamic document. The courts should
keep in tandem with the national ethos when interpreting the provisions of a living
document like the Federal Constitution lest they be left behind while the winds of
modem and progressive change passes them by. They should, when discharging
their duties as interpreters of the supreme law, adopt a literal approach in order
to implement the true intention of the framers of the Federal Constitution. They
should not stubbornly cling to an archaic and arcane approach formerly adopted.
It is the primary duty of the courts to resolve issues of public law by having resort
to the provisions of the Constitution, which is the supreme law.
The significance of Tan Tek Seng is much more far reaching than the concept
of fairness it has introduced. On a more po itive note, the Malaysian courts after
that case have embarked on a dynamic interpretation of the Constitution. Procedural
Fairness, the product of the combined effect of Articles 5(1) and 8(1) was further
extended to include the following rights:
4 (1995) I MLJ 308.
Ibid. at p. 315.
6 Supra n.l.
This point was affirmed in the subsequent cases of Hong Leong Equipment (/11 Bhd \' LieII'
Fook Chuan & anor appeal (1996) I MLJ 481 and R Rama Chandran \' The Industrial ourt of
Malavsia & Allor (19971 I MLJ 145.
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Right To Reasoned Decisions
The Court of Appeal in Hong Leong Equipment Sdn. Bhd. v Liew Fook Chuan
& anor appeal," after holding that Procedural Fairness is part of our law, further
held that Procedural Fairness imposed a duty on public decision makers to give
reasoned decisions. The court however, restricted the operation of such a duty to
situations where a fundamental right enshrined in Part II of the Federal Constitution
is adversely affected in consequence of such a decision made by a public decision
maker. It needs to be pointed out that Hong Leong went further than the earlier
case of Rohana bt Ariffin & Anor v USM.9 In Rohana, it was held that there was
no general right to a reasoned decision" whereas Hong Leong recognised a general
right to a reasoned decision provided a fundamental liberty is adversely affected.
Another matter to note is that in Hong Leong the right to a reasoned decision is
linked to the deprivation of a fundamental liberty.
Professor M.P. Jain criticized the judgment in Hong Leong by saying that 'the
obligation to give reasons has been extended to the area of fundamental liberties
and not to situations where other rights may be affected by discretionary decisions'.
He further stated that 'it may be hoped that this decision will have its impact
generally on Malaysian Administrative Law and the practice to give reasons for
decisions taken by administrators may become more widely prevalent than is the
case at present and extend to all cases rather than be confined to cases arising under
fundamental liberties guaranteed by the Constitution'. II
Two years later, in Sugumar Balakrishnan v Director of Immigration, State of
Sabah & Anor'! the Court of Appeal conceded to the abovementioned criticism and
extended the duty to all cases where the rights of a person are adversely affected by
a public law decision. The ruling in this case on the duty to give a reasoned decision
marks a distinct and deliberate departure from common law where it has been
consistently held that the rules of Natural Justice do not require a public decision
maker to provide reasons for his decision. 13
It may be noted that this extension of the right to Procedural Fairness is most
welcome and is based on Article 8(1) of the Constitution which is the heart of due
process in this country. By relying on Article 8(1) alone, there is no necessity to
relate it to any breach of any fundamental liberty provisions in the Constitution and
the scope of procedural fairness or the right to be heard generally is accordingly
extended to its widest amplitude.
8 Ibid.
Q [1989] 1 MU 489.
10 Followed the common law principle laid down in Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries &
Food (1986) AC 997.
11 M.P. Jain, Administrative Law of Malaysian and Singapore, 3rded. (1997) MLJ, at p. 428.
12 [1998] 3 MU 289.
JJ upra n.l0.
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Right to make a plea in mitigation
In Utra Badi all K. Perumal & Anor v Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam,"
the High Court held that the right to make a plea in mitigation of the punishment
proposed to be imposed on a public officer after the finding of guilt by a disciplinary
authority is part of 'a reasonable opportunity of being heard' under Article 135(2)
of the Federal Constitution. This is because a consideration of the appropriate
punishment to be imposed involves a separate decision-making process altogether
whereby a second opportunity of being heard is rendered necessary. On appeal to
the Court of Appeal," the court upheld the High Court's decision. Gopal Sri Ram
JCA in allowing the right to make a plea in mitigation stated as follows:
The combined effect of articles 5(1) and 8(1) of the Federal Constitution is, in my
judgment, to demand fairness both in procedure and in substance whenever a public
law decision has an adverse effect on any of the facets of a person's life ... Among
these facets are a person's livelihood and his reputation.
Procedural fairness demands not only the right in a public servant to make
representations on the truth of the charges framed against him. It includes the right,
after a finding of guilt is made against him, to make representations on the question
of punishment. That this must be the case may be seen by examining the disciplinary
process itself'. 16
Unfortunately, the Federal Court, on appeal," overruled the Court of Appeal's
decision that the respondent should have been given a right to make a plea in
mitigation. According to the Federal Court, Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution
which demands a reasonable opportunity to be heard be given to a public officer was
complied with here. The show cause letter that was sent to the respondent conveyed
with sufficient clarity and certainty the contemplated punishment of either dismissal
or reduction in rank. Thus, the respondent had at the earliest available moment been
informed of the two possible punishments under consideration in the event he is not
able to exculpate himself of the charge made. He had been accorded every opportunity
to defend himself, which he did by a letter. However he made no representation a
regards punishment though he had been made aware of the two possibilities. It is
submitted that if the re pondent i supposed to make a plea in mitigation in his
written representation, this would amount to an indirect admi .sion of guilt, as the
process of mitigation always takes place after the finding of guilt i made.
The Federal Court further examined General Order 26 para (4) of the General
Orders and said that there is no separate right to make representations upon the
punishment that ought to be meted out to the officer to be dismissed or reduced in
rank. The General Orders, according to the deral Court, in detailing the procedures
14 [19981 I AMR 9:699.
I' [200013 MIJ 281.
I~ Ibid at 296.
[2(X)l1 2 MLJ 417.
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have sufficiently complied with Article 135(2) of the Constitution and in the process
are in accord with the concept of Natural Justice and Procedural Fairness.
It is submitted that the decision of the Federal Court in the above decision is
a setback in the progress of Administrative Law in our country. The Federal Court
did not examine the scope of Articles 5(1) and 8(1) so as to bring the right to make
a plea in mitigation under both these articles, as was done by the Court of Appeal.
Thus it is respectfully submitted that the Federal Court had denied the respondent
his fundamental right to make a plea in mitigation as guaranteed by Article 135(2)
read together with Articles 5(1) and 8(1).
Having examined the above cases which have linked Procedural Fairness to
Articles 5(1) and 8(1), it is submitted that an even wider right to procedural fairness
may be claimed under Article 8(1) alone if it (Article 8(1)) is given its widest and
most liberal interpretation without being linked with any other fundamental right
provisions in Part II or Part Xl8 of the Constitution. This is because Article 8(1)
which postulates the equal protection clause has the inherent capacity of being
interpreted as housing the concept of due process, both substantive and procedural.
The scope of procedural fairness guaranteed under Article 8(1), standing on its own,
is wider than that protected under any other provision in the Constitution. It is wider
than the combined effect of Articles 5(1) and 8(1) as Article 5(1) is limited to 'life
and personal liberty' and it is also wider than Article 135(2) which is confined to
a reasonable opportunity of being heard be given to public officers before they are
either dismissed or reduced in rank.
The procedural protection under Article 8(1) extends beyond fundamental
rights. It is thus contended that Article 8(1) has the potentiality of becoming the
heart or fountain of procedural due process or fairness in the face of administrative
actions or decisions that have adverse consequences on an individual's rights or
interests.
SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS
The traditional common law approach to judicial review is that a reviewing court
is primarily concerned merely with the decision-making process and not with the
merits of the decision itself. 19 However, Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ pointed out in R Rama
Chandran v Industrial Court:"
.It is often said that judicial review is concerned not with the decision but the decision
making process. (See e.g. Chief Constable oj North Wales Police v Evans). This
proposition at full face value, may well convey the impression that the jurisdiction
of the courts in judicial review proceedings is confined to cases where the aggrieved
I~ Part II is entitled .Fundamental Liberties' and Part X confers some constitutional rights on the
members of the public service.
IQ Chief onstable 0/ North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 3 All ER 141, 154, per Lord
Brightman.
'Il upra n 7.
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party has not received fair treatment by the authority to which he has been subjected.
Put differently, in the words of Lord Diplock in Council oj Civil Service Unions &
Ors v Minister jor the Civil Service, where the impugned decision is flawed on the
ground of procedural impropriety.
But Lord Diplock's other grounds for impugning a decision susceptible to judicial
review make it abundantly clear that such a decision is also open to challenge on
grounds of 'illegality' and 'irrationality' and, in practice, this permits the courts to
scrutinize such decisions not only for process, but also for substance.
Thus the Federal Court decision in R. Rama Chandran v Industrial Court
allows the courts to review both the procedural and substantive aspects of a decision.
However, the first indication of the reception of substantive fairness into our
jurisprudence could be seen in Tan Tek Seng although the Court of Appeal made no
specific reference to the term' substantive fairness' as such. In that case, the Court of
Appeal held that the fairness requirement in Article 8(1) read together with Article
5(1) ensured not only a fair procedure, but also that a fair and just punishment is
imposed. Therefore the second requirement of a fair and just punishment indicates
that the court intended it to be an additional facet of fairness over and above
Procedural Fairness. The only other context in which fairness can be said to arise is
a substantive one. Thus, it is submitted that from the above requirement, the learned
judge could only have been referring to the doctrine of substantive fairness.
However, in Sugumar Balakrishnan, the Court of Appeal clearly stated that
'fairness' under Article 8(1) included Procedural Fairness and Substantive Fairness.
Gopal Sri Ram lCA stated:
The result of the decision in Rama Chandran and the cases that have followed it is
that the duty to act fairly is recognised to compose of two limbs: procedural fairness
and substantive fairness. Procedural fairness requires that when arriving at a decision,
a public decision-maker must adopt a fair procedure. The doctrine of substantive
fairness requires a public decision-maker to arrive at a reasonable decision and to
ensure that any punishment that he imposes is not disproportionate to the wrongdoing
complained of. It follows that if in arriving at a public law decision, the decision-
maker metes out procedural fairness, the decision may nevertheless be truck down
if it is found to be unfair in substance.".,
It is submitted that the Court of Appeal's stance to incorporate Sub tantive
Fairness into the doctrine of fairness in Article (l) and to adopt Sub tantive
Fairness as a new ground of judicial review i to be applauded. By introducing
Substantive Fairness as a separate ground of judicial r view, the Court of Appeal
has armed the judiciary with a very useful and effective weapon to strike down
unlawful administrative action.
'I Supra n 12 at p. 320.
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However, unfortunately, the Federal Court in the above case reversed the decision
of the Court of Appeal and struck down the doctrine of Substantive Fairness. The Federal
Court referred to the judgment of Edgar Joseph Jr in R. Rama Chandran and stated:
The Court of Appeal seems to introduce the doctrine of substantive fairness as a
separate ground in its review of the administrative decision of the State Authority
under the Act by invoking Article 8(1) read together with Article 5(1) of the Federal
Constitution. The Court also relied on R. Rama Chandran.
In our view, Parliament having excluded judicial review under the Act, it is not
permissible for our courts to intervene and disturb a statutorily unreviewable decision
on the basis of a new amorphous and wide ranging concept of substantive unfairness
as a separate ground of judicial review which even the English courts in common law
have not recognised ... As was stated by Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ in R Rama Chandran
(supra) when he observed that courts can scrutinise decisions not only for process,
but also for substance, and he certainly was not putting forward a new head for
judicial review ...
[W]e cannot agree with the Court of Appeal that the doctrine of substantive fairness can
be invoked as a separate or additional ground of judicial review of an administrative
decision.
The Federal Court's judgment has attracted and continues to attract severe
criticism. It is considered as a bad authority. Therefore it is respectfully submitted
that the Court of Appeal's broad and liberal view on the doctrine of Substantive
Fairness is preferred to the Federal Court's decision. The Federal Court's restrictive
view on the same may be categorised as an anti-fundamental right. The Court of
Appeal was invoking the constitutional dimension to our public law which is a
broad and dynamic concept. The Federal Court unfortunately failed to realize and
appreciate the significance of this approach as it was labouring ynder the spell or
narrowness of common law regarding the same.
PROPORTIONALITY
Proportionality i a weJl entrenched principle in the Continental system of Droit
Adrninistratif. This principle requires public authorities to maintain a sense of
proportion between their particular goals and the means they employ to achieve
tho e goal, so that their actions impinge on individual rights to the minimum extent
necessary to preserve the public interest. 22 In essence the doctrine provides that a
court of review may intervene if it finds that the harm attendant upon a particular
exercis of power i di proportionate to the benefits sought to be achieved."
22 upra n 11 at pp 482-483.
'.1 Bailey. Jones and Mowbray, Cases and Materials on Administrative Law, 2nd ed. 437.
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The principle of proportionality was first discussed in Britain in Council of
Civil Services Union v Minister for Civil Services", Lord Diplock envisaged the
possibility of adopting this principle at some future date as a ground of judicial review
of administrative action in common law." In the following year, in Nottinghamshire
CC v SS for Environment/" the appellants relied upon proportionality as a primary
ground to establish unreasonableness. The House of Lords refused to go into this
question and neither expressly affirmed nor denied proportionality as a requirement
of reasonableness.
In R v Secretary of State for Home Dept; ex p Brind," there were differing
opinions on the viability of proportionality as a ground of judicial review of
administrative action. Lord Roskill stated that although this principle was not
appropriate on the facts of the instant case, there is a possibility that it may develop
in the future as a separate ground of judicial review. However, Lord Ackner and
Lord Lowry rejected this principle as an independent head of judicial review and
treated it as a part of Wednesbury unreasonableness.
The principle of proportionality was used as a ground of judicial review in
very few cases in Britain. In R v Barnesley Metropolitan Borough Council, ex p
Hook28, the Council revoked a stallholder's licence for urinating "in a side street
after the market had closed. The Court of Appeal applied the ground of denial of
natural justice when it quashed the Council's decision. The court also stated that the
Council's decision was a 'disproportionately drastic step' or that 'the punishment
(was) altogether excessive and out of proportion to the occasion.'
The common law courts are reluctant in adopting proportionality as a separate
head of judicial review. If they do so, this would mean that the courts would
be assessing the merits of a discretionary decision taken by the administration.
Therefore, the courts, in most cases treat proportionality merely as an aspect of
Wednesbury unreasonableness. This is because as a facet of unreasonableness, the
court will interfere only when the action impugned is totally out of proportion to
the mischief sought to be curbed so as to border on the absurd. On the adoption of
proportionality as a separate ground of judicial review, Professor M.P. Jain states:
It is, however, possible that in the near future proportionality may develop into a
distinct head as it has been asserted by the judiciary again and again that "judicial
review is not fossilised" and that heads of judicial review are not exhaustive ...
{Aliso Britain's membership of the European Economic Community may have its
impact in the course of time."
l~ [19RSI A 374.
1~ Note that so far the British courts have applied the principles of proportional it) as a part of the
Wedlll!shw:v unreasonableness.
1~ 119861 1 All ER 199.
2' [19911 1 AC 696.
[19761 Wl.R 1052 ( 'OA).
upra n 11 at p.48S
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In Malaysia, this doctrine was for the first time applied in the landmark case
of Tan Tek Seng." The Court of Appeal, when deciding whether the punishment of
dismissal imposed on the appellant by the Education Service Commission was too
severe, stated:
A public servant against whom a criminal charge has been proved '" mayor may not
be dismissed solely in reliance of that ground. It depends on the particular facts of
each case ... But it must, when deciding what punishment it ought to impose on the
particular public servant, act reasonably and fairly. If it acts arbitrarily or unfairly or
imposes a punishment that is disproportionate to the misconduct, then its decision, to
that extent, becomes liable to be quashed or set aside.
The Court of Appeal eventually held that the punishment of dismissal was
too severe a punishment and substituted it with reduction in rank. The Commission
had failed to take into account all relevant factors before it imposed the sentence of
dismissal. If it had taken the relevant factors into consideration, it may well have
come to the conclusion that dismissal was too severe a punishment to impose upon
the appellant and that a lesser punishment ought to be imposed.
The Court of Appeal based the application of this doctrine on Article 8(1) of
the Constitution which constitutes the heart of due process in our system. This was
later adopted by the Federal Court in R. Rama Chandran" and the Supreme Court
in Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v Zaid bin Haji Mohd Noh32
The Court of Appeal in Sugumar Balakrishnan" referred to its own earlier
dictum in another case which summarises the law on the doctrine of fairness:
The result of the decision in Rama Chandran and the cases that have followed it is
that the duty to act fairly is recognised to comprise of two limbs: procedural fairness
and substantive fairness. Procedural fairness requires that when arriving at a decision,
a public decision-maker must adopt a fair procedure. The doctrine of substantive
fairness requires a public decision-maker to arrive at a reasonable decision and to
ensure that any punishment he imposes is not disproportionate 'to the wrongdoing
complained of. It follows that if in arriving at a public law decision, the decision-
maker mete out procedural fairness, the decision may nevertheless be struck down
if it is found to be unfair in substance."
However, the Federal Court ruling in Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara
& 2 Ors35 wa a setback to the forward march of this doctrine. Although the
10 upra n I.
.11 Supra n 7. ote that Edgar Joseph Jr Fe] in this case referred to this doctrine as a ground of
judicial review.
12 lI977] I MU 89.
)) upra n 12.
14 Ibid at p 323.
l~ (1997)4 MR 53:4193.
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Federal Court did not specifically refer to the doctrine of proportionality as such,
the cumulative effect of the decision in this case is that there can be no review of
punishment and the express overruling of Tan Tek Seng on the same narrow point
of law is that there appears to be no room for the operation of the doctrine of
proportionality as envisaged by the Court of Appeal in Tan Tek Seng.
It is respectfully submitted that the above Federal Court's decision is no
authority to the contrary because that case and the cases that followed it were decided
totally on some old common law concepts which should no longer be in vogue in
the present era. A case which sought to decide important issues of public law by
avoiding the supreme law as enshrined in the Constitution, particularly, Article 8(1),
should be viewed with disfavour and suspicion.
It is to be noted that the doctrine of proportionality is part of the wider concept
of reasonableness or non-arbitrariness housed in Article 8(1) of the Constitution.
The concept of substantive fairness under Article 8(1) is wider than proportionality.
It is capable of being deployed to strike at any law or action or decision of a public
nature which is arbitrary or unreasonable. Used in the manner described, it may
be observed that Article 8(1) is capable of imparting a very activist and dynamic
dimension to the field of public law in time to come provided that the courts adopt an
activist and dynamic approach in interpreting issues of public law which adversely
affects the rights of the people. Its use is preferred to 'wednesbury unreasonableness'
partly also because it has the strong backing of a fundamental liberty provision of
the Constitution.
The Malaysian cases which have been highlighted so far on the doctrine of
proportionality have examined the same in relation to whether the punishment
imposed was proportionate to the wrongdoing. However the application of this
doctrine was accurately described by the Court of Appeal in its recent decision, Dr
Mohd Nasir bill Hashim v Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia" as follows:
When interpreting the other parts of the Constitution, the court must bear in mind
the all pervading provision of art. 8(1). That article guarantees fairness of all forms
of State action (see Tan Tek Seng ~'Suruhanjaya Perkhldmatan Pendidikan [1996]
1 MLJ 261). It must also bear in mind the principle of substantive proportionality
that art. 8( 1) imports (see am Kumar v Union of India AIR 2000 SC 3689) ... In
other words, not only must the legislature or executive response to a state of affairs
-be objectively fair, it must also be proportionate to the object sought to be achieved.
This is sometimes referred to as the "doctrine of rational nexus" (see Malaysian Bar
& Anor ~'Government of Malaysia [19871 2 MLJ 165). A court is therefore entitled to
strike down State action on the ground that it is disproportionate to the object sought
to be achieved.
36 120061 6 Ml..J 21. , at pp 21l)·220.
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RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE
A common feature of the statutory framework in Malaysia is the inclusion of a
variety of ouster clauses designed to exclude judicial review of administrative action.
The Malaysian courts have generally viewed ouster clauses as inimical and an
unacceptable impingement of their inherent supervisory jurisdiction. The Court of
Appeal's decision in Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd. v Transport Workers
Union" and the Federal Court decision in Hoh Kiang Ngan v Mahkamah Perusahaan
Malaysia" clearly show the judicial abhorrence of ouster clauses. Both the cases have
negated the efficacy of ouster clauses to a great extent by their ruling that errors of
law fall within the ambit of jurisdictional errors and that consequently, ouster clauses
are ineffective to prevent judicial review of decisions made in error of law.
A few years later, the judiciary (the Court of Appeal, in particular) moved a
step further by placing emphasis on the right of an aggrieved party to have access to
justice. A significant decision in this context is that of the Court of Appeal in Sugumar
Balakrishnan," where the court held access to justice to be a constitutional right.
According to Gopal Sri Ram lCA, the right of a litigant to seek redress from a court
is part of his or her personal liberty within Article 5(1) and hence a fundamental
liberty. Parliament cannot therefore legislate to limit or restrict such right. An
ouster of jurisdiction by an Act of Parliament would therefore be prima facie void.
However, by resort to the rule of harmonious construction, such an ouster would
only prevent judicial review of a public law decision that is made in accordance
with law in the Anisminic sense."
Such an interpretation is unprecedented and clearly depicts the new judicial
trend in Malaysia of invoking the provisions of the Federal Constitution, not only
to curb the abuse of administrative power, but also to prevent any whittling of the
scope of judicial review. The Federal Court, on appeal, however, reversed the Court
of Appeal's decision, stating:
By deliberately spelling out that there shall be no judicial review by the Court of
any act or decision of the Minister or the decision-maker except for non-compliance
of any procedural requirement, Parliament must have intended that the section is
conclusive on the exclusion of judicial review under the Act.
In our view, Parliament having excluded judicial review under the Act, It IS not
permissible for our courts to intervene and disturb a statutorily unreviewable decision
on the ba is of a new amorphous and wide ranging concept of substantive fairness as
a eparate ground of judicial review which even the English courts in common law
have not recognised.
17 [1995] 2 MLJ 336.
1S [1995J MU 369.
40
upra n 12.
ee Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147.
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As mentioned earlier, the judgment of the Federal Court in Sugumar
Balakrishnan has attracted severe criticism and is considered as bad law. Nowhere
in its judgment did the Federal Court say that access to justice is not a fundamental
right.
The Court of Appeal, however, re-affirmed its stand that access to justice is
a fundamental right in Kekatong Sdn. Bhd. v Danaharta Urus Sdn. Bhd.,41 but this
time under Article 8( I) of the Constitution. The Court of Appeal in this case was
asked to decide on the constitutionality of section 72 of the Pengurusan Danaharta
Act 1998 (a partial ouster clause). The court took a drastic view and held that
the section is unconstitutional vis-a-vis Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution for
violating the common law right of access to justice which is an important part of
the Dicean Rule of Law housed in Article 8(1). The Court of Appeal expressed its
view in the following words:
We would sum up our view on this part of the case as follows: (i) the expression
"law" in art.8( 1) refers to a system of law that incorporates the fundamental principles
of natural justice of the common law: Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor; (ii) the
doctrine of the rule of law which forms part of the common lawdemands minimum
standards of substantive and procedural fairness: Pierson v Secretary of State for
the Horne Department. ex parte Leech; (iv) the expression "law" in art. 8(1). by
definition (contained in art 160(2)) includes the common law. Therefore access to
justice is an integral part of art. 8 (1).
Unfortunately, the Federal Court," on appeal, overruled the Court of Appeal's
decision. The Federal Court referred to the right of access to justice as was discussed
in the Court of Appeal and held that the court had erred in interpreting Article 8(1)
and Article 160(2) of the Constitution. Article 160(2) authorises the reception of
common law "[ijn so far as it is in operation in the Federation ... ", which refers
to a law that has already brought into operation the common law of England in
the Federation. That law is section 3(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 ('the CLA').
Section 3( I) of the CLA permits the reception of English common law subject to the
qualification that it may be lawfully modified in the future by any written law. Thu
according to the Federal Court, Article 160(2) of the Constitution must be con trued
in the light of section 3(1) of the CLA in that it may be modified when necessary.
To that extent it is qualified and not absolute.
'Common law' in Article 160(2) is therefore a reference to common law and it
is in that sense that the right must be incorporated into Article 8( I). As the continued
integration of the common law right of acce s to justice into Article 8( I) depends on
any contrary provision that may be made by any written law as pro ided by section
3( I), it cannot amount to a guaranteed fundamental right.
econdly, the Federal Court stated that the right of ace ss to justice must b
subject to rules and regulations that enable the exercise of that right. \ hich may
41 (200313 MLJ 1.
42 1200412 MR -' 17.
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be varied from time to time, in particular Article 121(1) of the Constitution, which
confers jurisdiction to the High Court. Articles 8(1) and 121(1), according to the
Federal Court, complement one another, in that Article 8( 1) confers a general right,
whereas Article 121 (1) confers powers on the Parliament to set up an institutionalised
mechanism with the power and jurisdiction on the extent and manner in which that
right is to be exercised. The Federal Court stated that."
The jurisdiction and power of the courts as provided by law is clearly the dominant
element which determines the boundaries of access to justice. Article 8(1) cannot
therefore be read in isolation ... The corollary is that the manner and extent of
the exercise of the right of access to justice is subject to and circumscribed by the
jurisdiction and powers of the court as provided by Federallaw.
Applying the above principle, the Federal Court held that section 72 of the
Pengurusan Danaharta Act is a federal law made by the Parliament under the
authority and scope of Article 121(1) and is a written law within the meaning of
section 3( 1) of the CLA, which modifies the right of access to justice as is permitted
by the same. The right of access to justice integrated into Article 8(1) must therefore
yield to the change made.
It is respectfully submitted that the Federal Court's decision has diluted the
strength of Article 8(1), which as mentioned earlier, is a due process clause. If the
right of access in Article 8 can be modified by written law, then that would mean
that the provision that guarantees equality before the law in the Constitution (which
is the supreme law of the land) is subject to modification by statutes. The Federal
Court, instead of holding that the right of access to justice under Article 8(1) has to
yield to changes made by written law, could have held that although Parliament is
empowered to pass laws which confer powers and jurisdiction to the High Court,
these laws are still subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, the
right of access to justice under Article 8( I) (one of the provisions in Part II of the
Constitution which enshrines fundamental liberties) should not ~e easily taken away
by written law.
41 ibid at p. 3.6.
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CONCLUSION
The developments brought about by Tan Tek Seng, Hong Leong Equipment, Rama
Chandran and the Court of Appeal's decision in Sugumar Balakrishnan were long
overdue. They should have come a decade or two earlier. We have to accept them
magnanimously as part of our law. They need to be there to protect and preserve our
much-cherished fundamental rights as protected and guaranteed by the Constitution.
However, the recent Federal Court decisions that were discussed above on the whole
does not seem to live up to the expectations and hopes kindled by Tan Tek Seng,
Hong Leong Equipment, Rama Chandran and the Court of Appeal's decision in
Sugumar Balakrishnan. It appears that the interpretation of our supreme law is yet to
find a right leg. Nevertheless, coupled with the need to defend, protect and preserve
the more noble principles of the rule of law, constitutionalism and democratic
government, we have to forge ahead and further develop our own common law in
the field of Public Law in conformity with these principles.

